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IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM OF
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CANADA
RICHARD H. LEACH*
The reform of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 has profound implications
for the functioning not only of the national government but of those of the prov-
inces as well. In some respects the new constitution breaks new ground, so that it
will be some time before the full impact of constitutional change in the provinces
can be assayed.
Even though the necessity of central authority has always been begrudgingly
acknowledged, the theme of local rights has been played over the years as stri-
dently as it has been south of the Canadian border-and with much greater effect.
In recent years especially, the Canadian governmental piper has been increasingly
harkening to the tune of that theme. The purpose of this paper is to examine how
the reformed Canadian Constitution may affect the federal-provincial dance in the
future.
That dance must first be understood in historical terms, for the past was very
much a factor in the negotiations leading to agreement on the terms of the
reformed constitution. If anything stands out in Canadian history since 1867, it is
the power of the provincial presence on the Canadian governmental stage. Even
at the outset, the script for the confederation drama was written by provinces.
Indeed, the patriated constitution of Canada continues the long tradition of a
compact among the provinces as the basis of the Canadian state.
The development of that tradition need not be traced at any great length.
Historians generally agree that the resolutions which were essentially enacted by
the British Parliament and together served as Canada's first Constitution as the
British North America Act of 1867' ("BNA Act") were regarded by the represen-
tatives from Canada East and Canada West as a treaty, a compact between the
two founding peoples of Canada, and that the original idea of a "racial compact"
was later transformed into a geopolitical compact. As G.F.G. Stanley summed it
up: "the meeting of the maritime [sic] delegates with those of Canada at Char-
lottetown and at Quebec introduced a new interpretation which has had mighty
impact upon the course of our later history, namely, the idea of a compact between
the politico-geographic areas which go to make up Canada."' 2 Stanley concluded
that the "Compromise of Quebec became a compact between the provinces which
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participated in the conference," and the London Resolutions, which incorporated
those made in Quebec with little substantive change and were submitted to Parlia-
ment, did nothing to alter "the contractual nature of the pact."
4
For their part, members of the British Parliament also accepted the idea of a
provincial compact. Charles Adderley, M.P., who introduced what was to become
the BNA Act to the House of Commons, told the House that federation had "in
this case . . . been a matter of most delicate mutual treaty and compact between
the provinces."' 5 Lord Carnavon said almost the same thing to the House of
Lords.6
In other words, the immediate predecessor of the patriated constitution was the
product of provinces negotiating as provinces. It accepted as basic the idea of prov-
inces as the contracting parties. Though after the BNA Act went into effect differ-
ences of opinion arose among the provinces over the pact concept, it "has always
been the principal buttress of provincial autonomy ' 7 and is relied on particularly
by Quebec in its insistence on a special place in confederation.
How important the idea of a compact of contracting provinces as the basis of a
state is to the amourpropre of those provinces can be understood more clearly when
Canada is compared to the United States. The Federalists, who carried the day at
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, rooted the American Constitution in the
consent of the people, a concept whose challenge to the states was immediately
obvious to the Antifederalists. The Convention, Patrick Henry noted, spoke "the
language of, We, the people, instead of, We, the states. " Indeed, that is precisely
what the Constitution accomplished, Alexander Hamilton rejoiced in The Feder-
ah'st No. 22.9 Though Jefferson and others were later to insist on referring to the
Constitution as a compact to which the states had acceded as states,10 the idea
never won wide acceptance and was finally laid to rest in 1869 by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the landmark case Texas v. White. I The Court noted that the
act "which consummated [Texas'] admission into the Union was something more
than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political
body." 12 What the Constitution had wrought was a complete and indissoluble
union.' 3 Thus, the Americans opted for something quite different from the
Canadians. The American Constitution is founded on popular sovereignty, the
BNA Act on provincial power.
In addition to being the midwives at Canada's birth in 1867, the provinces
became increasingly influential in charting the course of Canada's growth into
3. Id. at 107.
4. Id. at 108.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 108-09.
7. Id.
8. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 22 (J. Elliot 1901).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 146 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
10. Jefferson's clearest statement of the idea is in the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, which he drafted.
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[Vol. 45: No. 4
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM
adulthood. The provinces, for their own self-protection and advancement, chose
in 1867 to devise a system in which the central government would have consider-
able power. Thus not only did the BNA Act vest in the national government a
great many important legislative powers in section 91, it also lodged power in the
central government to appoint provincial lieutenant governors, judges of the
higher provincial courts, and members of the Senate from the provinces; gave the
central government power to reserve or disallow any provincial legislation within a
year of its passage; and enabled Parliament, under certain circumstances, to enact
remedial legislation affecting the status of separate schools in a province. As
Norman Ward concluded, "the British North America Act certainly intended to
establish . . .a . . .system . . . in which the Dominion government was to be
paramount.'14 And in fact a period of nation-building was entered into after 1867
on the basis of section 91, which brought the national government for a while into
paramountcy among Canadian governments. In the process, the foundation for
modern Canada was laid.
Even so, time was on the side of provincial power. To draw from Norman
Ward on the point, the eventual development of responsible government in ten
provinces "inevitably led to centralism within each province, and hence to rivalry
with the Dominion." Moreover, the addition between 1870 and 1949 of only a few
large provinces rather than of many smaller ones "minimized the Dominion gov-
ernment's opportunities either to dominate the provinces, or to 'play them off
against each other. . . ." And the "mere problem of space" in so large a territory
as Canada inevitably made Ottawa remote from much of the country and
enhanced "the importance of provincial capitals. . . ." Perhaps the final blow to
central dominance was the discovery and exploitation of natural resources in the
provinces "and the rise of powerful industries based on them," the regulation and
control of which were not among the powers bestowed on the national government
in section 91. "And to these comprehensible economic and political elements must
be added the mysteries of judicial decision," which steadily reduced Parliament's
power, "while the powers of the provinces were at the same time steadily
extended," generally under the property and civil rights clause in section 92 of the
BNA Act itself.15
In short, as the conditions which led the four founding provinces to demote
their own power in 1867 changed, as new political and economic conditions which
.14. Ward, The Struaure of Govrment, in THE CANADIANS 1867-1967, at 29 (J. Carclass and R. Brown
eds. 1967).
15. Id. at 29-30. As Henry Albinski put the same point:
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Canada." Then the Privy Council shifted its attention to Section 92 of the BNA Act, in which "Prop-
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the "peace, order, and good government" entitlement of the federal government.
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called for exertions of provincial power developed, and as judges, over time, began
to read the BNA Act differently, the coin of the Canadian state was flipped. As
Cole Harris has summed it up:
[Tihe growing. role and visibility of the provinces and of provincial governments. . . [took]
place while governments were assuming a larger role in Canadian life and while the evolu-
tion of the Canadian economy was changing the significance of some of the terms of the
British North America Act. In an age of water power and steam, control of natural
resources did not mean what it does today. Provincial governments . . . assum[ed] a
growing role in the economy, and the province a growing role in Canadian feeling. A host
of activities that once were organized at many [local] scales [came to be] organized provin-
cially. At the same time federal power. . . also increased, as Ottawa, too. . . expanded its
services and its economic presence. In short, provincial and federal governments [grew]
simultaneously at the expense of a multitude of other scales of Canadian interaction. This
[was] a recipe for conflict. It reduce[d] a whole gamut of different relationships at different
scales to a polarized struggle between two levels of government. 
1 6
Through the years the provinces more often than not were the victors in that
struggle, while the power of the central government was diminished. War and
depression in the twentieth century temporarily halted-and even reversed-the
movement, but after World War II, it resumed with even more vigor.
Thus as the provinces approached the table to negotiate the patriated constitu-
tion with the federal government in 1980, they did so with a long tradition of
provincial power behind them. They could hardly be expected to abandon that
position as the negotiations proceeded.
The provinces had even more at stake at the bargaining table than preserva-
tion of the compact notion and continuation of their eminence in the exercise of
governmental power, for they also had a vested interest in the process of intergov-
ernmental consultation to defend. The federal-provincial conference had become,
especially after World War II, the standard way of dealing with most important
domestic policy questions which arose for governmental action. Whether it is a
first ministers' (the Prime Minister and the provincial premiers) conference, a con-
ference at the ministerial or departmental level, or one of a variety of special ad
hoc intergovernmental conferences, Canadian domestic policymaking remains by
and large the product of conference negotiation.
With increasing frequency in recent years, the provinces have taken the initia-
tive in setting the agenda for federal-provincial meetings. Very often the end
product is a bilateral agreement between Ottawa and a single province, though
multi-governmental agreements are not uncommon. The provinces favor the pro-
cess since each of the bargaining sessions is sui generis, often providing opportuni-
ties for particular provincial interests to be advanced.t 7 Indeed, as Gordon
16. Harris, The Emotional Structure of Canadian Regionalism, in THE CHALLENGES OF CANADA'S
REGIONAL DIVERSITY 28 (1981).
17. Roger Gibbins points out, however, that while federal-provincial conferences do
provide, undoubtedly, a badly needed forum for the representation of provincial interests . . . there
are many definitions of "the provincial interest," depending on who is consulted: provincial voters,
provincial governments or provincial representatives in the federal cabinet . . . . Within any single
province definitions will differ among voters, interest groups, provincial parties, federal MPs and fed-
eral cabinet representatives. Thus it would be a mistake to accept uncritically the rhetoric of the
provincial governments and to assume that they speak in the provincial interest.
R. GIBBINS, REGIONALISM, TERRITORIAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 96 (1982).
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Robertson, speaking out of his long intimate personal experience as a federal
bureaucrat involved in the intergovernmental consultation process, put it recently,
federal-provincial meetings have tended to become occasions "for the articulation
of distinct provincial interests and for provincial intrusion into wholly federal
areas of concern.""' His observation was underscored by Michael Kirby, who was
once secretary to the cabinet for federal-provincial relations: "Provinces, like indi-
vidual citizens, are . . . tending to take an individualistic rather than a collective
view of the country. . . on a scale that is unprecedented in Canadian history."' 9
Alberta's protracted quarrel with Ottawa over an oil-pricing agreement is a spe-
cific example of Kirby's point. But a number of the other provinces approach
bargaining with the federal government from a similarly self-centered position;
even a "have-not" province like Newfoundland, under its feisty premier Brian
Peckford, is learning how to get the most for itself out of negotiations with Ottawa.
The importance of the federal-provincial conference to the provinces, however,
is not only that it provides a mechanism for provincial governments to be effec-
tively involved in the handling of the important public policy issues, but also that
it "has facilitated the adaptation of parliamentary procedures to a federal system
." Each conference aims at reaching "mutual agreement." These agree-
ments, numbering in the thousands, enable the Canadian system of government to
work. They permit the partial acceptance of both centralist and regional view-
points and reject "the idea that either one embodies the whole truth. '20 As such,
the federal-provincial conference has been an admirable way over the years to
settle most of the division of power issues that have arisen between Ottawa and the
provinces.
Thus the provinces in Canada have come to occupy a powerful position in
Canada's governmental matrix, both in fundamental power within confederation
and in the procedure for developing public policy to convert that power into pro-
grams. It was from this position that they approached the challenge Prime Min-
ister Trudeau gave them when he presented the fail accomph of a reformed
constitution.
This is not the place to chronicle the events of the constitutional battle of 1980-
81.21 Suffice it to say here that on a number of crucial points the provincial
premiers forced Prime Minister Trudeau to yield to their demands. Thus the draft
finally sent off to London could rightly be considered as representing provincial
interests--or at least those of the governments in power in nine of the ten prov-
inces (Quebec never accepted the draft Constitution). Now that the patriation
process is over, those nine provincial governments might be expected to be looking
forward to living with the product of their labors happily ever after.
That expectation, however, is probably ill-founded. The acceptance of the
18. Gordon Robertson, quoted in CONFRONTATION AND COLLABORATION-INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS IN CANADA TODAY 82-83 (R. Simeon ed. 1979).
19. Lecture by Michael Kirby, Carleton University, Ottawa (April 1980), quoted tn The Financial
Post, May 3, 1980, at 7, col. 1, 4.
20. Elton, Placing Constitutional Reform in Perspeczwe, 2 SPECTRUM 6 (1981).
21. See the contribution to this volume of Mallory, The Pohhcs of Constitutional Change, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982, at 53.
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reformed constitution by the provinces will vary from province to province.
Quebec provides the extreme case. She stands adamant on her rejection of the
reformed constitution. Quebec's leaders oppose it, first of all, on general grounds
as an improperly drawn up document that violates Canadian "constitutional con-
ventions." The provincial government brought an action in the Quebec courts
contending that the province has a right to veto a major constitutional change
affecting provincial jurisdiction. The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled early in April
1982 that the province had no such right. 22 Quebec immediately appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada. The Court dismissed the appeal. 23
In arguing its case before the Supreme Court, Quebec predictably contended
that Canada is the product of a political compact between its two founding lan-
guage groups and that no changes in the existing constitution (the BNA Act) can
be made without Quebec's agreement in behalf of the Francophone group. The
province also objected to several of the particulars of the 1982 Constitution: the
elimination of financial compensation to provinces which choose to opt out of fed-
eral programs, the asserted right of mobility for workers across Canada, and the
protection of language rights for the Anglophone minority within Quebec. In
short, Quebec is concerned that it will lose its special status in confederation.
Quebecers see this status as having been ravaged, especially by the Charter of
Rights, which Premier Ren6 Lvesque refers to as "the contraption that's called
the bill of rights."'24
Ottawa has maintained a standing offer to resume constitutional negotiations
with Quebec on the points of contention, but provincial leaders have not so far
indicated any willingness to accept the offer. Far from manifesting a conciliatory
attitude, Quebec's stance has become increasingly strident. Not only did Uvesque
and leaders of the Parti Qu6b6cois boycott the formal promulgation ceremonies in
Ottawa and stage a counter-demonstration at home, but Premier Lvesque
"refused to rule out the possibility of individual acts of civil disobedience on the
part of members of his government" after the constitution came into effect "and
admitted that withholding tax transfers to the federal government" was not out of
the question.25 At the very least, Premier Uvesque promised that his government
will make maximum use of the constitution's notwithstanding clause (section 33).26
Bill 62, enacted by the Quebec National Assembly in early summer 1982, asserts
that Quebecers' fundamental freedoms and rights are subject only to the provin-
cial charter of rights, not to the constitution's Charter of Rights, and that the
education provisions of Quebec's Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) will
continue to be applied in the province rather than the parallel but different provi-
sion in the new constitution. By taking such actions, Quebec made sure that in
Premier Lvesque's words, there will be "a lot of judicial muddling." In any case,
the Premier promised, "we're working like mad at whatever can be done to
22. Re Attorney Gen. Que. & Attorney Gen. Can., 134 D.L.R.3d 719 (1982).
23. Re Attorney Gen. Que. & Attorney Gen. Can., 140 D.L.R.3d 385 (1983).
24. Quoted ti Globe & Mail, Mar. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 1, 3.
25. Id.
26. For an explanation of the notwithstanding clause, see infra note 35 and accompanying text.
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counter the bloody thing. '27
Thus Quebec's future within confederation remains unclear. The ruling Parti
Qu~bcois has pledged to make sovereignty for Quebec the main issue in the next
provincial election, which is not likely to take place for another two or three years.
Premier lvesque let himself be quoted in early June 1982 as saying that "with
another push" Quebec would become independent by the end of the decade. 28 In
the interim, Quebec, Canada's second largest province, is in constitutional limbo.
Not to belabor the point of different provincial reactions to the reformed con-
stitution, it need only be said that the energy-rich provinces of Alberta and British
Columbia can be expected to regard the reformed constitution from a different
perspective than the other provinces because of section 50, which amends section
92 of the BNA Act with regard to power over non-renewable resources by shifting
responsibility therefor to the national government. Similarly, the perspective of
the Atlantic provinces will be skewed by the long dependence of that area on fed-
eral payments from Ottawa. And with provincial governments likely to remain of
different political persuasions from the federal government--seven of the provinces
in 1982 were under Progressive Conservative governments, one was under a NDP
government, one under a Social Credit government, and Quebec, of course, under
the Parti Qu6b6cois-a variety of perspectives toward the reformed constitution is
to be expected.
The expectation of the continuation of a strong provincial presence in Cana-
dian governmental affairs under the reformed constitution is further brought into
doubt when the nature of the document itself is considered. One "disturbing
aspect" of the whole process by which constitutional reform was achieved, Ter-
rence G. Carroll concluded, "was the bargaining and horse-trading which took
place" in the course of negotiations. "Proponents of a system of elite accommoda-
tion will properly point out that all of [the changes which resulted from the bar-
gaining] represented a willingness to compromise and a real commitment to reach
an agreement on the side of the political leaders of the country." But the other
side of the coin was perhaps, Carroll thought, a weakening of public support for
the constitution. The public was forced to witness a "conference at which the
'fundamental rights' of Canadians, and the 'fundamental rule' of the Canadian
political system, changed hour by hour."
If a constitution is to be effective it must be widely believed to embody the highest form of
human law. It must be thought to represent the best interests and the best instincts of the
society. It is unlikely that the Canadian constitution can quickly regain this status as a
result of a complicated compromise arranged entirely by the political elite. 2 9
Not only is the reformed constitution thus perhaps weakly rooted in popular
acceptance, but much of its contents seem tentative or transitional in nature. In
fact, perhaps one ought not to use the word constitution without quotation marks
around it to indicate that it is not really a full-blown constitutional document, any
more than was the BNA Act of 1867. Indeed, the BNA Act (now to be called
27. Quotedin Globe & Mail, Mar. 30, 1982, at 1, col. 1, 3.
28. Globe & Mail, June 10, 1982, at 4, col. 4.
29. T. CARROLL, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 88 (1982).
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Constitution Act, 1867) is fully incorporated into the patriated constitution, to be
sure with some important new provisions. Not only is the new constitution also
"merely a British statute," presented to Parliament after "little public debate, and
[with no] endorsement by the electorate, '30 but by its very terms it is incomplete
and open-ended. It not only assumes that a great many amendments will be made
in its text in forthcoming years--indeed, the nature of the amending process was
one of the stickiest points in the negotiations leading up to the final agreement-
but it calls in section 37 for a constitutional conference, "composed of the Prime
Minister and the first ministers of the provinces," to be convened by the Prime
Minister within one year after the Canada Act comes into force. Though the
intention of the section seems to have been to provide a way to settle the rights of
Canada's native peoples, an issue left unresolved in the negotiations process, the
terms of section 37 require only that the conference "shall have included on its
agenda an item" concerning native rights. The conference agenda, which presum-
ably will be drawn up conjointly by the two levels of government, may be much
longer--section 37 also speaks of "discussions on any items on the agenda."
The first "section 37" conference was held on March 15-16, 1983. It dealt with
the narrow question of native peoples' claims that they were never properly com-
pensated for the lands taken from them by the French and English settlers. No
consensus was reached on the matter by the ten provincial premiers and Prime
Minister Trudeau attending the sessions, and other agenda items were disallowed.
Presumably other constitutional conferences on native rights will be held in the
future.
The reformed constitution was also left open-ended by section 49, which pro-
vides that another "constitutional conference" is to be called by the Prime Min-
ister within fifteen years, at which he and the provincial premiers will "review the
provisions" of Part V, which is concerned with procedure for amending the consti-
tution. The lack of agreement on an amending formula undoubtedly prevented
earlier patriation of the constitution to Canada. The question is whether the 1981
version will turn out to be any more satisfactory than the earlier rejected for-
mulae. 31 As Alexander Brady wrote years ago: "In a liberal federation . . . the
devising of a satisfactory procedure for amendment is rarely easy and seldom gives
satisfaction. "32
Other parts of the reformed constitution threaten to diminish provincial power
by shifting responsibility to the national government. These include the guarantee
in sections 25 and 35 of the rights of aboriginal peoples, and the provisions in
sections 50 and 51 amending section 92 of the BNA Act with regard to power over
non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources, and electrical energy.
Special mention must be made of section 36, which commits both the provinces
and the national government to the principle of equalization, specifically to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the wellbeing of Canadians; (b) furthering economic
30. R. GIBBINS, supra note 17, at 28-29.
31. See the contribution to this volume by Dellinger, The Amendng ftocess in Canada and the United
States: A Comparative Perspective, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982, at 283.
32. Brady, Constitutional Amendment and the Federation, 29 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. Sci. 486 (1963).
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development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and (c) providing essential public ser-
vices of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
The national government is further committed under section 36 to "the principle
of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have suffi-
cient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reason-
ably comparable levels of taxation." Only time will tell what becomes of these
principles in application. The wording of the first part of the section raises doubts
in some minds as to its justiciability. "Without altering the legislative authority of
Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with
respect to the exercise of their legislative authority," reads that section, "Parlia-
ment and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada, are com-
mitted" to equalization. That wording alone supports the judgment of Professor
Thomas Courchene that the Canadian courts will ultimately have to become "the
final arbiter" of what actions qualify as constitutional steps toward fulfilling that
commitment, as indeed the courts will also become in determining what would be
a "reasonable" equalization formula under the second part of section 36. 33 How
the provinces will fare under judicial rulings is a matter of conjecture.
Similarly, the impact on the provinces of the centerpiece of the reformed con-
stitution, its Charter of Rights, is a matter of conjecture. As with the equalization
provision, Charles Campbell has concluded, "the main effect of the Charter will be
to strengthen the role of the courts as a procedural policeman. '34 Already a spate
of challenges to the Charter has been made in provincial courts. If Canadian
experience follows that of the United States, judicial interpretations of federal
versus provincial power over rights will be inconsistent. The Canadian experience
will be complicated by the terms of the compromise that had to be included in the
Charter in the form of the "notwithstanding" clause, which was intended to
accommodate provincial uneasiness. This clause provides that provincial legisla-
tures may override for five years (and longer if the override legislation is renewed)
the Charter's provisions in the areas of fundamental freedoms (such as freedom of
assembly, press and belief), legal rights (such as the prohibition of the use of ille-
gally obtained evidence in court), and anti-discrimination guarantees. On the one
hand, different reactions by individual provinces may be expected-the NDP gov-
ernment of Manitoba early said that it would not use the override provision-thus
making any unified provincial position on rights highly unlikely. On the other
hand, a Canada-wide statement of rights may in the long run be a strong force for
nationalization. As the eminent Canadian political scientist, Donald Smiley, con-
cludes, there will inevitably be "a disposition to change the Canadian political
system and political culture in a fairly fundamental way by inducing Canadians to
identify themselves and to frame their allegiances in terms of their rights as pro-
tected by national institutions, and thus the ongoing provincialization which has
become so pervasive will be weakened." '35
33. Quoted in More Storm Clouds, Alberta Report, April 10, 1981, at 3.
34. Campbell, Charter of Rights Could Lead Courts into a Political Role, Globe & Mail, Feb. 18, 1982, at 7,
col. 1, 5.
35. Smiley, A Report to the Ontario Economic Council, quoted in Globe & Mail, Nov. 2, 1981, at 7.
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Attention should also be paid to section 42, which alters the BNA Act's provi-
sion for admitting new provinces. Whereas the BNA Act left it up to negotiation
between a territory and Ottawa, the patriated constitution allows a province to be
created or to expand only by gaining the approval of the federal government and
of at least six provinces containing in the aggregate half of Canada's total popula-
tion. The effect of that provision may soon be tested. Even prior to the proclama-
tion of the constitution, a plebescite was held in the Northwest Territories in which
fifty-six percent of those voting approved splitting the territories into two parts,
roughly corresponding to the Inuit and Dene populated areas there. Although it is
not binding, the plebescite is widely regarded in the North as "the first step in the
creation of at least two new northern provinces." '36 There are questions, the Globe
and Mail observed editorially, "about whether the division would make Ottawa
more reluctant to grant provincial status to the Northwest Territories. Anything
that would postpone this political maturity would be unfortunate," 37 particularly
in light of the possibility that if the territories are not given self-government,
"chunks of land could be swallowed by [provinces to] the south. . . . But it
should be remembered that Nunavit [the name given to the Inuit portion of the
area] is almost twice as populous as Manitoba was when it gained provincehood in
1870."38 The impact of new provinces on the existing provinces and on the bal-
ance of power between the provinces and Ottawa is hard to assay. They would
very likely add weight to the provincial side.
Finally, municipal governments, long at the bottom of the totem pole of gov-
ernmental power and recognition in Canada, have in recent years increasingly
asserted their desire to obtain formal constitutional status. As the details of the
patriated constitution were being worked out in 1980 and 1981, municipalities
repeatedly attempted to achieve that goal. They did not succeed, but they remain
determined, even though they were chastised by Governor-General Edward
Schreyer for taking that stand. In an address to the 1982 conference of the Federa-
tion of Canadian Municipalities in Ottawa, the governor-general, himself a former
provincial premier, decried the idea as unduly complicating the formal order and
structure of the nation. In any case, he doubted if anything like a consensus
among provinces could be obtained to support the objective of municipal govern-
ment. There is the possibility that municipalities would settle for a constitutional
statement of the national government's responsibility for achieving balanced
urban growth and development, but that too promises difficulties. Either answer
to the municipalities' prayers would cause a shift in provincial power.
Thus by conference, amendment, interpretation, and legislative action over
time, the position of the provinces under the 1982 constitution may be altered. A
different balance may also be struck as the provinces, with the national govern-
ment, explore ways of settling a wide variety of issues that have eluded resolution
in recent years. The real test of the new constitution, indeed, may be in how well it
serves the nation in making resolution of those issues possible. Certainly at first
36. Johnson, First Step on the Road to Two New Provonces?, Globe & Mail, Apr. 7, 1982, at 7, col. 2.
37. Globe & Mail, Apr. 8, 1982, at 6, col. 5.
38. Id. at col. 6.
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glance the 1982 constitution does not seem to change the context within which
resolution will occur. Among the issues the provinces wish to see resolved by some
combination of governmental action are the pricing of oil, about which Alberta is
still unhappy; control of telecommunications, in particular of cable and pay televi-
sion; revision of anti-combines legislation; jurisdiction over offshore seabed
resources and fisheries, an unresolved issue since at least 1949 and currently the
major squeak point in the relations between Newfoundland and Ottawa; the pro-
priety of national versus provincial lotteries; the establishment of uniform educa-
tion standards across Canada; the removal of economic barriers to the free
movement of goods, labor, and production factors across provincial boundaries;
provincial versus national responsibility for energy policy; and the abandonment
of the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement of 1897, under which western grain producers
have been guaranteed cheap transportation by rail of their products to market.
While these issues are important, they pale in significance beside the settlement
of the basic fiscal arrangements between the national government and the prov-
inces, including arrangements both for collecting income taxes and for transferring
funds from Ottawa to the provinces. Negotiations on these matters between the
provinces and Ottawa for the five year period 1982-87 broke down in the winter of
1982, and Ottawa unilaterally enacted a set of arrangements. Although the
arrangements will likely stand, and although the provinces will fare somewhat
better over the period than they had expected, the provinces were unhappy with
Ottawa's action, especially the dependent-on-Ottawa Atlantic provinces. In the
next round of discussions the provinces will probably exert themselves more
strongly than ever upon the resolution of these basic fiscal arrangements.
In the long run, it may appear that the reformed constitution itself is not cast
so as to provide Canada with the kind of underpinning required for future
national development. Except for the resource changes mentioned above, sections
91 and 92 stand in the reformed constitution even as they stood in the BNA Act,
still food for negotiation and eventually, for parts of them, grain for the judicial
grist mill, with no sure provincial or national advantage. As Eugene Forsey
summed it up, "This is not a new constitution. It's the old constitution with some
very important additions. There will be the same questions. Does this come under
section 91 or 92? Does section 93 apply?" 39 In short, the new constitution does not
get at the heart of the matter, the existing division of power between the national
government and those of the provinces. In particular, it does not address the con-
stitutional distinction made in the BNA Act between direct and indirect taxes, nor
does it deal with the harmonization of national and provincial taxes in general.
More broadly, the reformed constitution does not take into account "the economic
imperatives" of the modern technological state which "require unified if not uni-
form economic policies throughout the entire territory [of a state] and do not
brook that kind of economic fragmentation" so characteristic of Canadian feder-
alism in the past.4°
39. Quoted in Graham, Happy and Glorious, SAT. NIGHT, June 1982, at 30.
40. Lowenstein, Refections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age, in CONSTITUTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II 191, 211 (A. Zurcher ed. 1951).
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Indeed, the economic power of Alberta, and to a lesser extent, the other
resource-rich provinces, challenges the efficiency of policy making by the national
government and even of national leadership itself. At the very least, the interests
and objectives of those provinces clash with those of the other provinces. It is
unclear, in any event, how the new constitution will address the need for a new
balance between those provinces and Ottawa and between them and their sister
provinces. Nor is it clear how the new constitution speaks to the solution of any of
the problems alluded to earlier.
All that can be done at this juncture is to wait and see. Canada's new constitu-
tion, like that of the United States in the early days, will only be a paper contri-
vance until time and experience have filled out its meaning.
Even more important than the impact of unsolved problems on constitutional
development is the necessity many feel for fundamental reform in Canada's polit-
ical institutions, changes which were avoided in the constitutional negotiations of
1980-81. Some proposed basic constitutional changes might increase provincial
power. One proposed change would provide for an elected rather than an
appointed Senate, a Senate which would not be "irrelevant," but which would
perform the important function of providing a place where regional voices might
be heard at the center:
[W]here other federations have an elected second chamber to provide regional voices for
their constituents, our Constitution has provided, effectively, nothing but a vacuum. It is a
vacuum that has, of necessity, been filled extra-constitutionally ... [by] provincial
Premiers ... step[ping] forward as spokesmen for their provinces on national issues. [But]
provincial premiers are elected on provincial issues, to run provincial governments ....
They are not elected for their views on national issues.
4 1
The members of a reformed Senate would perhaps be elected by proportional rep-
resentation. Quebec could possibly be given a set percentage of seats to protect its
special status in confederation, and the smaller provinces could have delegations
disproportionately larger than their populations, to compensate for their smaller
representation in the House of Commons. A reformed Senate would probably be
accorded only limited legislative authority, not the full equality with the House
which the American Senate enjoys with the House of Representatives, out of
respect for the parliamentary system's reliance on confidence in the House of Com-
mons for responsible government. The Senate's role would be to increase the
weight of regional considerations in parliamentary deliberations. In particular,
Gordon Robertson believes, an elected Senate in place of the present one might
reduce "the sense of alienation and frustration in the West toward the federal
government. " 4 2
A second proposed basic structural change, not incorporated into the reformed
constitution, is some sort of proportional representation scheme for elections to the
House of Commons. The "first-past-the-post" electoral system traditionally
41. Kent, How to Enjoy Regional Diversitis, in THE CHALLENGES OF CANADA'S REGIONAL DIVERSITY
40 (1981).
42. Quoted in The Instiute, vol. 4, no. 2, Feb. 22, 1982, at 1. But see Fisher, Personal Viewpoint: Senate
Refornn, EXECUTIVE, Mar. 1982, at 81-82, who argues against any immediate change in the composition of
the Senate.
[Vol. 45: No. 4
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM
employed in Canada has resulted in recent years in exclusion of "even the major
parties from representation in certain regions of the country. As the [1979 and
1980] federal elections have shown, it is becoming increasingly difficult for any
party to form a government with representation from all regions of the country. ' 43
Thus there is no surety that regional interests will be weighed as they should be in
"the determination of programs, policies and priorities" in the House. Only if the
method of representation is revised, it is argued, will parties be enabled to partici-
pate in a process of national consensus-building "which is not a sham but an active
process in which regional diversities are acknowledged, assessed, in reason recon-
ciled and for the successful party, integrated into policies that earn national
confidence. '44
In any case, the 1981 census will result in a realignment of the House of Com-
mons. The membership of the House will rise to 310 at the first federal election
after 1984. Added to that chamber then will be additional representatives from
disaffected Quebec (6) and Alberta (6), as well as from Ontario (10) and British
Columbia (5). This may improve regional representation in the House to some
degree; even so, because of the constitutional necessity of overrepresenting the
smaller provinces,4 5 those four provinces, which contain 82.3% of the 1982 popula-
tion, will even then have only 78.7% of the seats in the House.
A third suggestion for basic constitutional change, also not incorporated into
the reformed constitution, would affect the well established pattern of intergovern-
mental consultation already referred to in this paper.4 As the government of
British Columbia pointed out in its 1978 series of Constitutional Proposals, the overall
intergovernmental negotiation process is a piecemeal one, "with little regard for
long-term objectives and priorities," consisting as it does of a "rather nebulous
clutter of committees . . . often without consistent objectives or formal organiza-
tion . . . [; too] little attention [has been] paid to coordinating the activities of
[this] vast network of . . . meetings and conferences" across the wide range of
policy areas involved. 47 Moreover, one set of participants in that process
has been elected on issues in federal jurisdiction, the other ten on issues in the jurisdiction of
[the] province[s]. They meet to argue, negotiate and, desirably, co-operate in the many
matters that involve both jurisdictions. [But] they must . . . be true to their watching
constituents on issues for which they were elected .... None of the participants has legiti-
macy as a spokesman for regional or provincial viewpoints on federal issues.48
In the view of some, a reformed Senate might take the place of some of the inter-
governmental consultation process; or it could be regularized and brought into
43. Notes for Remarks by the Prime Minister [Pierre E. Trudeau] at the Tenth Anniversary of the
Council of Maritime Premiers, Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 1, 1981, at 23. (Photocopy supplied to
the author by the Canadian Embassy in Washington.)
44. Kent, supra note 41, at 46.
45. Prince Edward Island with four representatives for its roughly 120,000 people is the example par
excellence of overrepresentation.
46. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
47. Province of British Columbia, British Columbia's Constztutional Aoposals, Paper No. 5, "Improved
Instruments for Federal-Provincial Relations," Sept. 1978, at 7-11.
48. Kent, supra note 41, at 41.
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some semblance of order through specific constitutional provisions governing its
conduct. However, David Elton argues,
this type of reform should not be confused with, or substituted for, increasing the ability of
national institutions to cope with regional diversity; intergovernmental mechanisms are not
sufficient for this purpose. The institutionalization of federal-provincial conferences,
without the reform of central government institutions in the direction of more effective
regional representation, could further erode the credibility and capacity of the national
government.
49
Other proposed reforms include changing the basis of appointment of Supreme
Court justices and improving regional representation on regulatory agencies of the
national government, so that they too would better reflect provincial interests.
Finally, a set of issues put on the constitutional agenda as long ago as October
1976 by the provincial premiers remains unresolved. These issues include the
national government's declaratory and spending powers, its moribund but still
extant power to reserve or disallow provincial legislation, its power to implement
treaties, and its residual power in general. Also left unaddressed are the issues put
forward by the First Ministers' conference of February 1979: empowering govern-
ments adequately to fight inflation and unemployment; dealing with non-tariff
barriers to interprovincial and international trade; providing for the regulation of
the Canadian securities market; and dealing with the role of commodity marketing
boards.
Whether any of these issues will win a place on the agenda of future constitu-
tional conferences seems unlikely. One point, however, which is not arguable is
the necessity of eventually facing most of these issues.
CONCLUSION
In their national political institutions, Canadians have tried to combine parlia-
mentary and federal forms of government. But, as Roger Gibbins so effectively
put it, parliamentarianism has "dominated and, as a consequence, national insti-
tutions have'become too majoritarian in character, too insensitive to the diverse
and pluralistic interests of a federal society." In particular, the traditional institu-
tions of the national government, which remain unchanged in the 1982 version of
the constitution, "have not facilitated the effective representation of territorial
interests. . . . Parliamentary norms and the tightly disciplined party system they
[engender bottle] up territorial conflict and [deny] it an effective outlet through
the institutions of the national government. . . ." The Senate has never been a
useful "forum for the protection and promotion of territorial interests," and in the
House of Commons, the "less populated sections of the country [have been] out-
gunned and overrun in national politics when regional MPs found themselves on
the wrong side of the party fence." Such ineffectual "territorial representation
within the national government," Gibbins concluded, "has led to constitutional
turmoil and uncertainty .... "50
In the constitutional negotiations leading up to the constitution of 1982, the
49. Elton, supra note 20, at 11.
50. R. GIBBINS, supra note 17, at 78.
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issue of the lack of adequate regional representation within the institutions of the
national government was sidestepped in favor of what were thought then to be
even more important problems-securing a constitutional basis for Canadians'
rights and a workable amendment process. Thus the new constitution, like the
BNA Act it incorporates, leaves territorial conflict to be resolved almost exclusively
by provincial governments. "The inability of the Canadian political system to
handle territorial conflict effectively has in turn weakened its ability to handle
other issues, as the contemporary energy and budget disputes between Ottawa
[and the provinces] so clearly illustrates."'5' Change in these institutions will not
be easy. Yet, the argument for change is a valid one, and the need to act on it is
impelling.
The reformed constitution, in fine, as embodied in the Canada Act of 1982,
should be regarded as the product of only the first phase of constitution-making in
Canada. The struggle for power between Ottawa and the provinces has not been
ended by its proclamation. Open-ended as the reformed constitution is, the bal-
ance of power is very likely to change considerably in the years ahead. Whether
the change will favor the provinces or Ottawa depends on a number of variables
which will be brought into play over time by the federal cabinet and Parliament,
provincial premiers and legislatures, judges of courts of appeal and the Supreme
Court of Canada, and federal and provincial bureaucrats. It is even possible that
the Canadian people might eventually insist on having an input. And in the
longer run, if constitution-making goes on to include some or all of the basic insti-
tutional changes just discussed, the final balance may be different still. As Roger
Gibbins reasoned: "The creation of more effective means of regional representa-
tion in Ottawa would. . . weaken the power of the provincial governments," at
the same time weakening "the power of the federal cabinet over national institu-
tions." As he sees it,
At heart, the traditional degree of cabinet control and effective territorial representation are
incompatible . .. [I]f the federal cabinet is weakened by institutional reform while the
control of provincial cabinets over their own legislature is not similarly reduced, if majori-
tarianism is reduced within the national government but not within the provincial govern-
ments, then in the short run the federal system may be further destabilized in the direction
of greater devolution and provincial strength . . . [O]ver the long run, more effective
regional representation will strengthen the position of Ottawa vis-a-vis the provinces, even
though the federal cabinet's power within Ottawa would be diminished.
5 2
Thus the new constitution's impact on Canadian federalism will be long in
being felt. But that was to have been expected. As David Elton reminds us,
[I]t should not be thought that an end to the debate on patriation, amending formulae and
a charter of rights and freedoms will [have] conclude[d] the debate on constitutional reform
in this country. Quite the contrary. Constitutional issues will continue to force themselves
onto the public agenda and take precedence over other issues until such time as the struc-
tural framework of Canadian federalism has been adjusted to reflect the regional realities of
Canada.
5 3
What adjustments in the federal-provincial balance may finally result cannot
51. Id. at 194.
52. Id.
53. Elton, supra note 20, at 3.
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be predicted with any surety. One thing, however, is sure: the flexibility and
durability of the Canadian federal system will be put to the test in the years ahead.
The likelihood is great that it will survive that test and be with us into the indefi-
nite future.
